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Federally-Defined Judicial Immunity:
Some Quixotic Reflections On An
Unwarranted Imposition
John A. Maher*
'Tis 1984, a fine school of law celebrates a sesquicentennial and
Orwell's prophesy is seen to be defective in its timing.' Does this
mean that we are immune from the threat against which Orwell
warned? Of course not.
Let us admit that our species is not so advanced that any one of
us is entirely competent of either consistent respect for ourselves and
the rights of others or unswerving resistance to demagogues' appeals.
It is all too easy to assign responsibility for societal ills to our failure
to generate either a common ethic or voluntary respect for it. But, is
it not obvious that such assignments are pointless when the true
weakness of our kind has to do with imperfect perceptional, instinctual, intellectual and communicative human systems?
These are not words of despair. Humankind has much in which
to take pride and from which to draw hope. In terms of the evolving
biosphere we share, we are late starters who have performed rather
well although still given to abominations of sorts for which other
earthly creatures are not notable.
Only yesterday did we learn to write. Mass production of preservable writings is a relatively contemporary phenomenon. Since
wholesale data exchange became feasible,2 our technological advance
has accelerated at what seems greater than a geometric rate. That
our ethical development is limited is an unhappy fact which slogans
and reformulations do little to conceal. That our physical, psychological and intellectual profiles have not evolved on a nice Newtonian
* Professor, Dickinson School of Law; A.B. 1951, University of Notre Dame; LL.B
1956, LL.M (Trade Regulation) 1957, New York University. The author acknowledges his
gratitude to Janice Berman, Esq., J.D. 1983, Dickinson School of Law, Bradley K. Moss, Esq.,
J.D. 1983, Dickinson School of Law, and Linda T. Cox, J.D. cand. 1984, Dickinson School of
Law, for their contributions.
i. See generally G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
2. The author refers to broad acceptance of printing from movable type. Doing so, he
avoids the need to become involved in offending those who advocate any one of Castaldi,
Kaster, Gutenberg or several Chinese as the inventor of the "the printing press."

line suggests that they never will.3 Deferring to such as Teilhard De
Chardin,4 we nonetheless are unable to predict that our kind will
evolve to a plateau higher than that upon which we have wandered
for thousands of years. Thus, it behooves us to look to the values we
have achieved, to preserve and protect those commonly perceived to
be good, to strive to eliminate those which are subversive of the common good or otherwise are perceived to be evil, and to ameliorate
malign influences of sorts we are incompetent to eliminate. Each of
these invokes a common perception. Thus, we must be alert to the
principle that, since individual human perceptions are imperfect,
common perceptions cannot be perfect.
The writer admits some of his biases. He considers that Americans have much in which to take pride and from which to draw
hope. American's experiment in republicanism has proceeded for two
hundred years. When Judge John Reed undertook his labor of love
in 1834, the present Constitution of these United States had been in
effect for forty-five years. The day had come for those who merely
inherited the fruits of the Revolution and the limiting structure of
the Constitution. We, too, are inheritors.
Although we tend to use "Founders" as a word of art, it doesn't
take much research to discover that the Founders were not of a single mind on all or even many issues. Compromise was indulged to
both great and shameful effects.' There were themes upon which the
Founders agreed. Among these themes was the thought that the
right and power of governance are trusts rather than properties.
If this is so, we need not ask who are the entrusters and who are
the beneficiaries. We need not refer to the great Preamble to the
Constitution to respond. Those privileged to serve within the executive, judicial and legislative arms of the Republic have this much in
common: they are chosen for and freely accept the onus of responsible exercise of powers derived from the People. But this is theory
and conflicts with a degenerative tendency observable both within
and external to governments: as human organizations grow more
complex they tend to obscure their founders' purposes and to be operated for the benefit of the employees.
Witness, in this generation of inheritors, various disgusting
spectacles too numerous to elaborate in a calculatedly short article.
For example, what of those convicted of criminal abuse of office who
plead for light sentences on the thesis that losing access to the throttles of governmental power (and, perhaps, preferred parking at NaCf. C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (R.M. Hutchins ed. 1952).
See, e.g., T. DECHARDIN, LE PHENOMENE HUMAIN (1955) translated as
NOMENON OF MAN (B. Wall, 1959).
5. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (the three-fifths compromise).
3.
4.

THE PHE-

tional Airport) is punishment enough? Are we not told something of
the state of our society when the learned advocates of such convicts
do not shrink from pleas in mitigation analogous to that of the
fabled matricide who sought mercy because he was an orphan? We
surely are on notice that some folks, having achieved a place in government, regard office as such a property right that foreclosure from
it should be deemed punishment.
While the author considers existence of such attitudes as symptomatic of dry rot in the ship of state, he neither considers it the only
such symptom nor can he impose his views on others. However, to
the degree that readers can be coaxed to entertain the limited proposition that individually irresponsible office-holders represent a collective threat to the Republic as they inculcate disrespect for otherwise worthy institutions, it would be appropriate to ask the readers
to consider whether existing organs of government are so designed or
administered as to inculcate a spirit of irresponsibility among officeholders. If the answer is "yes", then toleration of any such condition
not only breeds disrespect for law but also greases the skids for societal avulsion.
Space allocations appropriate to this Sesquicentennial edition of
the Dickinson Law Review do not encourage a broad-ranging survey
of the potentials for exercises in official arrogance which are part of
the contemporary scene. Thus, the author solicits forgiveness as he
addresses the obvious, identifying only one parasitical vine of irresponsibility surely unintended by the Founders but nevertheless well
entwined around the Tree of Liberty. The reference is to a concept
that surely would have beguiled Orwell. How many of us did he
charm when he projected evolution of an egalitarian revolution into
an organized society to the point that the truly epitomizing motto
became "all animals are equal but some. . .are more equal"?'
The writer refers to the federal judiciary's evolution of a doctrine of judicial immunity. Among the governmental immunity theories evolved by federal courts, none is so immunizing as that benefitting judges. 7 This federal immunity doctrine is responsive to a
perception that judges can be encouraged to perform responsibly by
being assured of ultimate irresponsibility for excesses injurious to
those helpless to resist. Maintaining that federal courts lack constitutional warrant to cloak federal and state judges with immunity,
the writer is bold enough to suggest a legislative reform 8 if Congress
is persuaded that the nation should encourage responsible conduct of
6.
7.
Q. 237
8.

G. ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 148 (1954).
See generally R. Nagel, Judicial Immunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.
(1978); cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
See infra text accompanying note 109.

judicial office by confirming personal irresponsibility of judges in
particulars.
Many of us have heard complaints about federal courts' interferences with state courts. Some of us have listened to state judges
hold forth on the constitutional and practical insensitivities of federal
courts' addresses to state courts' actions. How many have heard state
judges complaining of immunities fashioned for them by federal
courts? Irony resides in the fact that state judges have been the principal reported beneficiaries of federal decisions elaborating judicial
immunity.9 Who has there been to complain but the admittedly few
plaintiffs who are known to have sustained unrequited injury by reason of federal courts' respect for precedent generated in jurisdictions
to which only the states are successors? 0 What kind of lobbying leverage do such victims have?
Lest we be too quick to say that there are greater problems and
too sanguine in pragmatic attention to allocation of priorities, let us
recall that the "very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."1 These are the words of one much closer
to the Founders than the inheritors who fashioned the federal immunization of judges. Must we not admit the ultimately subversive effect of any contradiction in our federal system that allows some to
set themselves apart as intrinsically better than others? Saying this,
one is forced to admit that, absent contrary constitutional or legislative expressions, common law courts, chancellors and state courts of
general jurisdiction can evolve theories of immunity as well as relief.
However, it is quite another thing to acknowledge that federal courts
have such power.
The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited. The Constitution
speaks to certain essential jurisdictions enjoyed by the Supreme
Court and otherwise defers to Congress. We are taught that "judicial power" is the "right to determine actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction." I s Seemingly, the judicial power contemplated by Article III of
the Constitution falls into two categories, one looking to "the character of the cause, whoever may be the parties", while the other "de9. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Roy, 386 U.S. 547

(1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 285 (1869); McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir. 1972); Rheuark v. Shaw,
477 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1979).

10. See, e.g., Floyd v. Baker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607) and Case of the
Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (P. 1610), incontext of 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
23 (15th
11.
12.
13.

ed. 1807) (whenever a legal right is invaded, there is a legal remedy).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (ICranch.) 137, 163 (1803).
U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 1.
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).

pends entirely on the character of the parties". "
Our history presents various instances when Congress conferred
jurisdiction upon or restricted "Article III courts." Despite the illusion sometimes entertained by students, it was not until 1875 that
Congress saw fit to entrust federal courts with a generalized "federal
question" jurisdiction.'8 Limitations on jurisdiction of federal courts
are the very reason for burdening private plaintiffs in such courts to
demonstrate existence of jurisdiction." Justice John Marshall taught
that it is tantamount to treason either to decline exercise of conferred jurisdiction or to assume that not given. 7
The Founders did not conceive of federal courts as lawmakers.
Among defeated initiatives in the Annapolis Convention were proposals for the Supreme Court to play some sort of legislative oversight role and for the Chief Justice to serve in something resembling
a privy council.18 Even the power of federal courts to punish contempts is rooted in statute.1" Although the Supreme Court said the
power is "inherent in all courts. . .[and]. . .[t]he moment the
courts of the United States were called into existence and invested
with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of" the
power to punish for contempt,20 the opinion in which this appeal to
the transcendental is found is one affirming validity of the Judiciary
Act in terms of powers literally conferred on inferior federal courts.
Focus on that which was deemed inherent was gratuitous and unfortunate but nonetheless understandable.
Like American lawyers today, nineteenth century judges were
the product of their professional environment. Before annointment as
judges, they practiced in state courts of general jurisdiction in which
the common law inherited from England continued (and, as we
stress to our students, continues) to evolve. Most nineteenth century
lawyers labored in an era when federal courts were burdened with
the Swift v. Tyson 21 illusion that they too, when exercising diversity
jurisdiction,were authentic evolvers of common law. Let us remember that the Swift v. Tyson heresy, enunciated in 1842, persisted
until 1938,22 and its effects persist to this day.28
14. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821).
15. Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
16. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 148 (1834); Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 7 (1799).
17. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).

18.

1 M.

FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787 97-104, 108-

110, 138-740; id., vol. 2, 73-80, 298, 328-29, 342-44.
19. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 17, 1 Stat. 83.
20. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510-11 (1847).
21. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

22. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
23. Note the Supreme Court's continued reliance on a tort per se decision, Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Rigsby, 222 F. 221 (5th Cir. 1915), aff'd, 241 U.S. 33 (1961), as justification for

How does Swift v. Tyson link to a consideration of the Supreme
Court's conferral of immunity from federal process upon state court
judges? Very simply, Swift v. Tyson and Randall v. Bringham,2 4 the
seminal case in the federal immunization line, are fruit of the same
psychologically poisonous tree. During the currency of Swift v. Tyson, federal judges were accustomed to acting as though they were
authentic inheritors of the traditions of common law courts of general jurisdiction; of course, they were and are not.
As adopted in 1789, section 34 of the Judiciary Act provided
that "the laws of the several states, except where the constitution,
treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise provide or

require, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
'25
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply."
This "Rules of Decision Act" is marvelously durable. But for substi-

tution of "civil actions" for "trials at common law," it survives almost unchanged.26
Durability, however, has not meant immutability. Thus, the Act
was the very stuff of federal courts' arrogation of power to evolve
common law during the ninety-six years from Swift v. Tyson to Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins.27 In Swift v. Tyson, Justice Story gave no
consideration to the history of section 34 as he relegated state courts'

decisions to a status less than "law" for purposes of the Rules of
Decision Act, while acknowledging such state decisions as "at most,
recognizing federal statutes' alleged implications of causes of action. Touche, Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579-80 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689 n.10 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Rigsby was decided
in the wake of the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases of 1885, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), later described
as "unfortunate" in Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.50 (1959),
but saved from overturn by a statute effecting a substantial cure. Judicial Code and Judicial
Amendments of 1948, 28 U.S.C. §1329 (1948)(repealed). Of course, tort per se formulations
are appropriate within an admitted jurisdiction to evolve common law, while federal courts
claiming to perceive causes of action implied by federal statutes do so to achieve jurisdiction.
See generally J. Maher, Implied Rights of Action And The Federal Securities Laws: A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 783, 786-89 (1980), reprinted in 23 CORPORATE
PiRACTICE COMMENTATOR 574, 578-80 (1982). The reader, of course, will recognize that stan-

dards applied by federal courts when considering a claim that a private right of action is
implied by the Constitution differ from those used when assessing a federal statute. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980), in context of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). However,
effective recognition that discrete portions of the Constitution imply justiciable constitutional
rights is dependent upon Congress' benign use of its power to define jurisdiction of federal
courts, and there can be no argument that presently constituted federal courts have been transmuted into courts of general jurisdiction by reason of Congressional toleration of the inference
mechanism.
24. 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 523 (1869).
25. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)).
26. The principal change has been substitution of "civil actions" for "trials at common
law." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
27. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

only evidence of what the laws are. ..

"

This, too, was under-

standable. Justice Story was a great advocate of uniformity of law
and this attitude and his scholarly appreciation of the international
law mercantile were influential in the early shaping of commercial
and maritime law as applied in American courts.2
The Supreme Court's power to evolve substantive rules of maritime law, however, was confined by the Constitution itself.3" The morass created by the Articles of Confederation81 was very fresh in the
minds of the first Congress as it carefully underscored the role of
federal courts in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. Establishment of federal courts as qualifiedly exclusive fora for things maritime is part of the same legislative scheme which included the Rules
of Decision Act. Indeed, the "savings clause" of section 9 of the Judiciary Act directly addressed situations in which relief at common
law was available82 at a time when Congress had not seen fit to establish a generalized federal question jurisdiction.33
In any event, Swift v. Tyson set a tone and a psychological context. The Supreme Court is first reported to have considered judicial
immunity in 1869.3" Not surprisingly, the Court in Randall v. Brigham placed no reliance on the Constitution. The Court could not. As
adopted, the Constitution dealt with immunity conferred by reference to office only in connection with federal legislators.3 5 What,
then, of expressio unius est exclusio alterius or, more pertinently,
expressio unius personae est exlucsio alterius? Only the eleventh
constitutional amendment deals with sovereign immunity.30 The
amendment was evoked by the Supreme Court's acceptance of jurisdiction of a suit against Georgia by a citizen of another state.37 Congress' first session after this event occasioned proposal of the eleventh
amendment which was ratified with "vehement speed." 38 Chisholm
v. Georgia" tells us that the basic six articles of the Constitution
were not seen as a bar to private plaintiffs' arraignment of states in
federal courts. What, then, of the states' servants?
In Randall v. Brigham, the Supreme Court was confronted by
28.
29.

41 U.S. at 18-19.
See generally, G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE
COURT (1971); De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (D. Mass. 1815).
30. U. S. CONST. art. III, §§1, 2.
31. M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION (1950).
32. 1 Stat. 76.

RISE OF THE SUPREME

33. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470.
34.

Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 285 (1869).

35. U.S. CONST. art. I, §6.
36. U.S. Const. amend. IX.
37.
38.

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 708 (1949) (Frank-

furter, J., dissenting).
39.

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).

an attorney's resort to the federal courts for relief against the alleged
misfeasance of a Massachusetts judge in effecting the plaintiff's disbarment. 40 Affirming the state court judge's immunity from suit, the
Supreme Court relied entirely on precedent generated by common
law courts and chanceries in England, Ireland and New York.
Among the Court's reliances was Coke, to whom was attributed the
thought
that insomuch as the judges of the realm have the administration of justice, under the King, to all his subjects, they ought not
to be called in question for any judicial proceedings by them,
except before the King himself, 'for this would tend to the scandal and subversion of all justice; and those who are most sincere
would not be free from continual calumniations.' 4'
The Supreme Court referred neither to Osborn v. Bank of the
United States" nor to ubi jus ibi remedium. 3 Writing for the Court
in Randall, Justice Field obligingly provided a policy guideline:
Unless judges, in administering justice, are uninfluenced by considerations personal to themselves, they can afford little protection to the citizen in his person or property. And uninfluenced. . .they cannot be, if, whenever they err in judgment as to
their jurisdiction, upon the nature and extent of which they are
constantly required to pass, they may be subjected to prosecution at the instance of every party imagining himself aggrieved,
and be called upon in a civil action in another tribunal, and perhaps before an inferior judge, to vindicate their acts."
The Court did not explain how a federal court of limited jurisdiction
was empowered to respond to this perception of a desirable policy.
However, the Court seemed to leave the door ajar for those injured
by some excesses of judges:
But responsible they are not, to private parties in civil actions
for their judicial acts. However injurious may be those acts, and
however much they. . .deserve condemnation, unless perhaps
where the acts are palpably in excess of the jurisdiction of the
45
judges, and are done maliciously of corruptly.
40.

74 U.S. at 290.. The author is disinclined to trace federal courts' distinctions, in

terms of applications of immunity doctrines, between courts of general and courts of only
limited jurisdiction for the simple reason that it is his thesis that federal courts lack authority
to afford immunity in either particular.

41.

Id. at 292 (quoting Floyd and Baker's Case, 12 Coke 25 (1608)).

42. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). "Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the
power of the laws, has no existence." Id. at 763.
43. "Where there is a right, there is a remedy" which differs markedly from "might

makes right." See generally 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
(4th ed. 1973); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23 (15th ed. 1807).
44.
45.

74 U.S. at 291.
Id. at 292 (emphasis supplied).

§55.04

The door was not long left ajar long. In 1872, the Court again
dealt with judicial immunity in context of disbarment." Justice
Field again wrote for the Court but, in Bradley v. Fisher, there was
a dissent.47 The majority opinion rephrased the policy premise for
judicial immunity:
For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the
proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequence to
himself. Liability to answer to everyone who might feel himself
aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistent
with. . .this freedom, and would destroy that independence
without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.4 8
Once again, common law jurisdictions provided the only precedent supporting implementation of this policy, but the Court went
much further than it had in Randall v. Brigham. The potential saving grace for victims of judges' excesses "done maliciously or corruptly" was removed. In Bradley, Justice Field substituted a distinction between "excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all
jurisdiction over the subject matter." For the latter, "no excuse is
permissible."'4 9 Concerning the former,
the law has provided for private parties numerous remedies, and
to those remedies they must in such cases report. But for malice
or corruption. . .whilst exercising their judicial functions within
the. ..scope of their jurisdiction, the judges can only be reached
by public prosecution in the form of impeachment, or in such
other form as may be specially provided."0
Justice Davis wrote a dissent in which Justice Clifford concurred. The dissent's burden was to maintain that a judge should be
prepared to defend himself against charges that his excesses were
maliciously or corruptly predicated." Unfortunately, Justice Davis
did not address the majority's failure to elaborate the Constitutional
predicate for a federal court to confer immunity upon a state judge.
There is no indication that the petitioner, in either Randall or Bradley, urged incapacity of federal courts to afford such immunizations.
The petitioners, however, presumably also were schooled in the common law, and the federal decisions clearly spoke to state judges' immunities in phrases familiar to common lawyers.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872).
Id. at 652 (Davis & Clifford, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 649.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id. at 652 (Davis & Clifford, JJ., dissenting).

Note that Randall and Bradley were approximately contemporaneous with the original Civil Rights Acts.52 Nearly three years after Bradley, Congress provided inter alia that "any officer or other
person charged" with summoning grand or petit jurors would be
guilty of a misdemeanor if he excluded otherwise eligible persons by
reason of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 53 In 1880,
a Virginia judge was charged with violation. In Ex parte Virginia,",
the Supreme Court rejected availability of judicial immunity. Unfortunately, the Court reached for a distinction between a state-imposed ministerial duty to compose jury lists and what the Court conceived to be the essential judicial role. "Whether the act. . .was
judicial or not is. . .determined by its character, and not by the
character of the agent. Whether he was a county judge or not is of
no importance. The duty. . . might as well have been committed to
a private person . . . .- Of course, the Court avoided weighing the
validity of its own judicial immunity doctrine against statutes implementing the equal protection thesis.
For many years, the Supreme Court was not particularly pressured to reconsider or to refine judicial immunity. Starting in the
1940s, renewed attention to the Civil Rights Acts compelled lower
federal courts' consideration of judicial immunity. Circuit courts
held for and against state judges' immunity from prosecution under
nineteenth century statutes addressing the conduct of persons.5" Notable was Learned Hand's simple statement that "so far as we can
see, any public officer of a state, or of the United States, will have to
defend any action brought in a district court under [Civil Rights
acts] in which. . .plaintiff, however irresponsible, is willing to make
the necessary allegations." 5' The Warren Court, however, did not let
its famed liberality get in the way of protecting judges. Explicitly
drawing on common law for the privilege," Chief Justice Warren
wrote in Pierson v. Ray that
this settled principle of law was [not] abolished by [§1 of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1871], which makes liable "every person"
who under color of law deprives another person of his civil
rights. The legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common law immunities
• ..The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role
is. . .well established, and. . .Congress would have specifically
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

14 Stat. 27 (1866); 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
18 Stat. 335 (1875).
100 U.S. 339 (1880).
Id. at 348 (emphasis supplied).
See, e.g., 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791, 793 (2d Cir. 1946).
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).

so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.

9

What was taken to be so well established was a doctrine defined
in 186960 with which Congress, legislating during the immediate
post-bellum stage of the Swift v. Tyson era, did not expressly tamper
when it imposed liability on "every person" who misuses office to
deny civil rights. Surely, immunity from the civil rights laws exists
per federal law or it does not exist at all. Why should Congress have
rebutted a common law privilege recently elevated to federal principle when Congress contemporaneously addressed all state officers,
great and small, in a context quite different from that obtained in
the 1869 Randall case? The first Civil Rights Act passed in 1866.61
The 18702 and- 187163 amendments were written in the same historical context. How did the Warren Court discover Congress' knowledge of and reliance on an 1869 caseG4 dealing with a disbarred attorney? Bradley was decided in 1872.65
Justice Douglas dissented in Pierson. Regrettably, he did so by
interpreting legislation" rather than by addressing the Constitutional warrant for the Supreme Court to encourage state judges' responsible conduct of office by assuring them of irresponsibility for
civil rights violations. Nonetheless, he did note the distinction between a "common-law doctrine of judicial immunity [as] a defense
to a common law cause of action" and saying that such an "immunity rule is a defense to liability which Congress has imposed upon
"any officer of other person'. . .or upon 'every person.' "'
Justice Douglas also knocked some of the props from under the
policy supporting federally defined judicial immunities.
If the threat of civil action lies in the background of litigation,
so the argument goes, judges will be reluctant to exercise the
discretion and judgment inherent in their position and vital to
the effective operation of the judiciary. We should, of course,
not protect a member of the judiciary who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other
personal motive not connected with the public good . . . . To
deny recovery to a person injured by the ruling of a judge acting
for personal gain or out of personal motives would be "monstrous". . . .This is not to say that a judge who makes an hon59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 554 (emphasis supplied).
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 285 (1869).
14 Stat. 27.
16 Stat. 144.
17 Stat. 13.
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 285 (1869).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872).
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 559-63 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 563-64.

est mistake should be subjected to civil liability. 8
Hard cases make bad law. Easy ones, seemingly, can be even
worse. Stump v. Sparkman" was decided by the Burger Court.
While the Burger Court has been known to smash a few icons erected by the Warren Court,7 0 such is not the case when it comes to
protecting the brotherhood of the bench from liability to their occasional victims. Indeed, the Burger Court has gone far beyond the
Warren Court. It is useful to consider questions proposed by the
great Cardozo.
May common law jurists "innovate at pleasure"? Can they
roam "at will in pursuit of [their] own ideal of beauty or goodness"
and callous of the rights of less exalted citizens? According to Cardozo, they cannot. "Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the
power of the laws, has no existence," for courts "are the mere instrumentalities of the law, and can will nothing." 1 Judge Cardozo, of
course, had not read Stump v. Sparkman.
Stump v. Sparkman involved a truly shocking fact pattern.
There was no municipal magistrate anxious to harass freedom riders
or pickets. There was no Canute refusing to permit blacks' registration as voters. Rather, the case presented a little scenario only
vaguely reminiscent of Nazi eugenics- but definitely worthy of a
soap opera.
Fifteen year-old Linda Sparkman's mother was unhappy with
her perception of Linda's sexual conduct. So what did Mother do?
She had a lawyer prepare a "Petition to Have Tubal Ligation Performed on Minor ' 72 and an indemnity for the physician who would
perform the procedure. Backing the petition was Mother's affidavit
that Linda was "somewhat retarded" although she had managed to
progress in school, that Linda spent nights with males, that Mother
had not been aware of such escapades as they occurred, and the ligation would be in Linda's interests to "prevent unfortunate circumstances." The petition cited neither a statute nor any rule to justify
68. Id. at 564.
69. 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
70. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (undoing
nonprice vertical restraint per se rule under § 1 of the Sherman Act erected in United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976) (burdening the implied cause of action theory casually
recognized in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971),
with scienter); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (calling a halt to the process, blessed by J.I.
Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), of casually recognizing causes of action by reference to
presumed congressional purposes).
71. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921). See also Osborn
v. Bank of the United States 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819 (1824); Terminello v. City of
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("We do not sit like kadi under a
tree, dispensing justice according to. . .individual expediency").
72. The petition is set forth at length in 435 U.S. at 351 n.l.

the solution proposed by Mother and did not petition for appointment of a guardian to protect Linda's interests. Presented ex parte
to the DeKalb County Circuit Court in Indiana, the petition was not
docketed! No guardian for Linda was appointed. No notice was afforded Linda. Judge Harold Stump approved the petition. His "order" was not filed. Linda, told she was to have a appendectomy, was
sterilized.7 8 Consider this against Justice Field's conviction that there
are always remedies. 74 Consider Linda's handling against our society's tender concern for full disclosure to investors, buyers of encyclopedias, and the like.
The sterilization occurred in 1971. Linda married in 1973. In
1975, she discovered her victimization. Invoking sections 1983 and
1983(3) of the Civil Rights Act, she sued Mother, Mother's attorney, Judge Stump and three physicians who had collaborated in the
procedure. Pendent state claims were asserted. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana dismissed the action. Judge Stump was "clothed with absolute judicial immunity,"
and all federal counts were dismissed after which, of course, there
was no jurisdiction over the counts rooted in state law.7 5
Reversing, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals maintained
that immunity was available only to judges possessed of subject matter jurisdiction. This, of course, is treacherous ground when looking
to state courts of general jurisdiction. Judge Swygert, writing for a
unanimous panel, acknowledged that excesses in office are immunized, but opined that immunity does not attach to a judge acting in
"clear absence of all jurisdiction. ''7 ' This seemingly accorded with
Justice Field's expressions in Bradley."7 Although Judge Stump's
court possessed jurisdiction over "all cases at law and in equity, 78
no specific "statutory or common law basis" for sterilizing minors
upon parents' petitions had been demonstrated. 9 Judge Swygert, inexplicitly endorsing Cardozo's views, was unable to conceive that an
Indiana judge could "arbitrarily order or approve anything presented
to him in the form of an affidavit of petition.18 0 The seventh circuit
applied an unlabeled expressio unius analysis to the fact that Indiana law provided for sterilization of certain institutionalized persons.81 This provision had various due process trappings. 82 The sev73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 353.
See supra text accompanying note 49.
Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 174 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (18710.
See supra text accompanying note 48.
522 F.2d at 174.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id.

enth circuit looked not only to the absence of substantive and
procedural rules pertinent to sterilization of minors but also to the
lack of attendance to Linda's rights as well as to the curious nonfilings of petition and "order." The court concluded that "[t]his kind
of purported justice does not fall within the categories of cases at
law or in equity" 83 concerning which Judge Stump had authority to
act. Cardozo would have been pleased.
Judge Stump resorted to the Supreme Court which, unfortunately for the Republic, proceeded not only to refashion judicial immunity to fit the case, but also to demonstrate that Cardozo knew
not of what he spoke.8 4 The ultimate Stump holding threatens us all.
Justice White wrote for the majority. After noting that the "governing principle of law is well established and is not questioned by
the parties," 85 he invoked the policy line and holding enunciated in
Bradley, garnished with an obeisance to Pierson, that "the legislative
record gave no indication that Congress intended to abolish this
long-establishedprinciple."" Due to Judge Swygert's excellent opinion, this was not enough to immunize Judge Stump. Justice White
elided the Bradley formula's reference to "judicial acts"187 as he
wrote that "[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the
action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was done in
excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only
when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.' "88
On the undoubted thesis that the DeKalb County Circuit Court
was a court of general jurisdiction,8 9 Justice White was not troubled
by the implications of the Indiana Legislature having provided for
sterilizations in cases other than Linda's. Rather, he wrote that it
was "more significant that there was no Indiana statute and no case
law. . .prohibitinga circuit court. . .from considering a petition of
the type presented to Judge Stump." 90 This sounds like part of a
joke, of which international lawyers are fond, in which one line
states that anything that is not prohibited is permitted. Per Justice
White, even if "a circuit judge would err as a matter of law if he
were to approve a parent's petition" to sterilize a child, there is no
indication that an Indiana judge "is without jurisdiction to entertain
83. Id at 176.
84. See supra text accompanying note 69.
85. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355 (1978). Obviously, the author would have it
that the governing principle is questionable in terms of its evolution and application by federal

courts of limited jurisdiction.
86. Id. at 356 (emphasis supplied).
87. See supra text accompanying note 44.
88. 435 U.S. at 356 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 652 (1872)).
89. Cf., Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Immunity, 64 VA. L.
REv. 833, 838 (1978).
90. 435 U.S. at 358 (emphasis supplied).

the petition." 9
Thus, the Supreme Court cautions us against confusing jurisdiction with proper exercise of power. The Court, however, does so in a
manner suggesting that, unless legislatures limit them, state courts

of original and general jurisdiction can entertain anything presented
in a proper form and, thus seized of "jurisdiction", can do anything
that strikes their fancy without fear of personal responsibility. The
refrain sounds alarmingly like something attributable to Judge Roy

Bean.9" The author need not and will not dwell on this invitation to
tyranny and oppression. Others have done so, although they have not
used such sharp words.93 Justice White ultimately addressed "judi-

cial acts" but apparently only to refute dissenters in Stump v.
Sparkman. Ignoring Ex parte Virginia" and a host of other prece-

dents concerning the essence of such acts,' 5 he wrote that "[t] he relevant cases demonstrate that the [determining] factors. . .relate to
the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally
performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e.,
whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity."'96
What was normal about Linda's situation? She was a child and
we are told that state court judges "not infrequently are called
upon. . .to approve petitions relating to the affairs of minors, as for
example, a petition to settle a minor's claim.' 7 Surely, in context,
this use of the word "normal" suggests that extraconstitutional procedures and issuance of unfiled orders in undocketed cases are normal, which, one hopes, is not the case. How do the expectations of
parties add to or subtract from a judge's power at all? This was no
consensual arbitration or televised California psudeo-judicial proceeding. Linda had no expectancy concerning a process of which she
was kept ignorant. What were the "relevant cases"? Those cited
were In re Summers,'8 having to do with the Illinois Supreme
Court's somewhat informal handling of applications for admission to
the bar, and McAlester v. Brown," having to do with hip-shooting
91. Id. at 359.
92. The fabled "Law West of the Pecos."
93. See, e.g., Nagel, Judicial Immunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS
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L.J. 879; cf. Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 176 (7th Cir. 1977). The Nagel, Rosenberg and Block articles are excellent, but they deal with the proper scope of judicial immunity
rather than its constitutional warrant.
94.

100 U.S. 339 (1880).
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1980 DUKE L. J. 879, 885-92, 897-910.
96. 435 U.S. at 362 (emphasis supplied).
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contempt citations issued in chambers.
Justice Stewart wrote a dissent in which Justices Marshall and
Powell concurred. On an obvious, but nonetheless cogent level, the
dissent denied the normality of Judge Stump's activity. More pointedly, Justice Stewart warned against confusing judge's assertions of
jurisdiction with the fact of jurisdiction and opined that none of the
policies supporting immunity were present in Stump v. Sparkman. 00°
Justice Powell added the observation that the majority's holding precluded "any possibility for the vindication of respondent's rights elsewhere in the judicial system," thus undercutting a central premise of
Bradley. 0 1

Contrast all this with rhetoric in a case focusing on the qualified immunity enjoyed by the Secretary of Agriculture. "No man in
this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law
may set that law at defiance with impunity. All officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law,
and are bound to obey it.' 10 2 That this is nothing but rhetoric was
3 in which, transcendentally deunderscored in Nixon v. Fitzgerald'"
fining absolute Presidentialimmunity, the Court taught that "abso-

lute immunity merely precludes a particular private remedy for alleged misconduct in order to advance compelling public ends',
which does not lift [the president or judges] 'above' the law."' 5
On its facts, Stump v. Sparkman frustrates realization of sub-

stantial rights conferred to implement the fourteenth amendment
and does so in the name of furthering an extra-constitutional policy
defined by courts for judges. It is too facile to say that Congress,
immediately after the War Between The States, honored the contemporaneous Randall and Bradley decisions and thereby elevated
extra-constitutional holdings to federal law. There was no similarity
between Judge Stump's action and that permissible for law or equity
100. 435 U.S. at 367 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 369 (Powell, J., dissenting).
102. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207-08 (1882). Respect for this principle can
be discerned in the opinion of Justice Blackmun in Pulliam v. Allen, 52 U.S.L.W. 4525 (May
14, 1984). The Court held that a successful petitioner for injunction under section I of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended, 42 U.S.C. [[1983 (1976 & Supp. V), against a Virginia
magistrate is entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney,s Fees Awards
Act, Id. [[1988. Handed down months after this article was written, Pulliam does not dissuade
the author from his essential point; i.e., federal courts of limited jurisdiction lack constitutional
power to adopt or evolve common law theories of liability or immunity. Justice Blackmun's
opinion proceeds from "the assumption that common-law principles of legislative and judicial
immunity were incorporated into" the federal judiciary system. 52 U.S.L.W. at 4257 (emphasis added). Thus, although delighted with the salutary but narrow holding in Pulliam, the
author is discontent with a methodology that relies on a mythology of federal jurisdiction
discredited since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
103. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
104. Id. at 758 (emphasis supplied).
105. Id. at 758 n.41.

courts."06
There is no appeal for Linda. There are no alternative remedies
for Linda. What has been ordained is a shield for sloppy judges,
ignorant judges and corrupt judges. It has been ordained by federal
courts of limited jurisdiction who have no right to evolve common
law except in areas of peculiar federal interest.1"' Immunizing state
judges is beyond the pale of a peculiar federal interest. The Stump
doctrine is wrong not only in specifics but in what it invites. That the
Stump doctrine emanates from a Court that knows the differences
among simple neglect, scienter and recklessness 0 " -when such a
difference does not affect judges-indicates that, left to its own devices, the Court is unlikely to emulate the courage of the Erie
Court '0 9 and recognize that the passage of time does not sanctify
unconstitutional error.
A cure is to be found in legislation rather than jurisprudential
reformulations. Congress arguably has power to immunize federal
judges if it deems such immunization appropriate to federal purposes. Only Congress has power to immunize state judges from liability for conduct violative of federal statutes. If Congress is persuaded of the need to encourage overall responsibility by conferring
irresponsibility in particulars, let it do so and let it proceed on two
levels; one for federal judges and one for state judges otherwise liable under federal statutes. Let Congress, for a model, look to indemnification provisions of modern corporate codes. 10 Open the federal
courts to plaintiffs injured through judges' violations of plaintiffs'
civil rights but indemnify the judges against the costs of not only
successful defenses but also, if their error was rooted in simple neg-

lect, of unsuccessful defense, including damages for which they are
held liable. There will be no lack' of qualified applicants for
judgeships.
Give life to ubi jus, ibi remedium so that the courts of the
United States of America never again hold that the least among us
must suffer as the price of a policy unspecified in the Constitution
but somehow transcending Constitutional rights. Justice Field's reliance on Coke was ill-placed."' Coke may speak to the states as inheritors of the crown, but he did not speak in context of the Consti106. See supra text accompanying note 69.
107. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)
(announced on the same day as Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
108. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
109. "If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do so." Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).

110. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983).
111. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

tution and courts limited to such jurisdiction as Congress is pleased
to confer. There are better words to which federal courts should
listen:
Under our system, the people are sovereign. Their rights,
whether collective or individual, are not bound to give way to a
sentiment of loyalty to the person of the monarch. The citizen
here knows no person, however near to those in power, or however powerful himself, to whom he need yield the rights which
the law secures to him when it is well administered."'
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